Conventional theory holds that an inverted bond yield (in this case where the two year pays more than the ten year) is a negative economic forecast. I have never been quite clear on whether this is regarded as a causal relationship or simply an observable correlation. The former seems unlikely – that the sight of a threatening yield curve sparks widespread fear and recession follows as a result of cautious behaviour – but I have heard people talk as if that is the case. It seems more likely that inverted bond yields are a response to or a forecast of tough economic times. I prefer to remember that bond prices are the terms on which borrowers and lenders choose to trade. High short dated yields might imply inflationary fears but they also reflect the credibility, or lack of it, of the governments that need to borrow. Lower long dated yields imply scepticism about future growth but they also suggest the belief that returns from safe investments will revert to the modest levels that became normal in the last ten or so years. A DECADE OF BOND MARKET MANIPULATION MAY HAVE DISTORTED INVESTORS’ PERCEPTION The obvious flaw with the idea that low long term yields are normal is that it is probably wrong. We have been conditioned by more than ten years of government bond market manipulation by central banks. In some countries like the US, the UK and the Eurozone, central banks have led the way with QE. It is a matter of opinion as to how independent of government influence these central bank actions have been. The fact that they have de facto financed unprecedented government borrowing, first through the Great Financial Crisis aftermath and then through Covid-inspired lockdowns, speaks for itself. HISTORY OF UK 10 YEAR GILT YIELDS Here are UK ten year gilt yields since 1980. In the 80s they were in a 10-15% range and then a 5-10% range basically until 2008 when the estimated $60 trillion of outstanding credit default swaps began falling like dominoes, threatening numerous financial institutions around the world. The chart illustrates nicely the result of the critical need for cheap money around the world. In...

5 Jul 2018

In Q1 the main UK indexes fell by between 6% and 8%. In Q2, they rose by 7% to 8%. The chart of the first six months is a “V” or perhaps a two-fingered salute to all the financial commentators who claim knowledge of the future. Bond yields again did almost nothing.   I have written elsewhere about the prevailing mood that seems to try to put a pessimistic spin on everything. As a result I would imagine that most people would be amazed to know that shares were so strong in Q2. How could they be in the turmoil of the imminent collapse of international trade, courtesy of the hardball tactics of Mr Trump and M Barnier, l’homme who loves to say “non”? The sole purpose of trade rules is to prevent trade from taking place and that these two gentlemen are both happy to use that threat as what I suppose we must call a negotiating tactic, if we could only tell what it is that they are trying to negotiate. Never mind that. The stock market doesn’t seem very concerned about it. Last quarter I listed thirteen everyday UK shares with markedly high dividend yields. Unsurprisingly, in view of the market performance, you would have done quite nicely if you had bought them. Not a single one of them went bust between April and June, I am pleased to say and the shares of none of them declined. It is better to look at valuations and to ask what they are telling us than to listen to what commentators are actually telling us. How about the yields on government bonds? I have said that there was little change in Q2 (despite innumerable predictions of falling prices) but are there trends and what do the absolute levels tell us? Germany is the benchmark bond for the EU. The ECB will continue its asset buying programme until the end of this year. It is still boosting asset prices by its own version of QE, implying that the crisis that started in 2008 continues. A year ago, 10 year Bunds yielded 0.5%. Now they yield 0.3%. Not many signs of imminent recovery there. Bond yields...

6 Jul 2016

On the face of it, the quarter was dominated by the UK Brexit referendum decision on 24 June though, in the main, trends were consistent throughout the quarter. The FTSE 100, which delivers its rare moments of outperformance in times of nervousness, had continued to do better than the FTSE 250 up to 23 June. After the referendum result this trend was dramatically extended, partly fuelled by the sharp fall of sterling against the US dollar. At the close of business on 30 June, the 100 was up by 4.9% in the quarter and the 250 was down by 4%, a huge difference in fortunes. (Despite this, over the last 5 years the 250 is +35% and the 100 just +8%). If this signalled nervousness about the future viability of the UK there was no sign of that in the performance of gilts. 10 year gilts yielded c.1.50% three months ago. Now they pay just 0.80%. What this seems to tell us that a prolonged depression is more likely than either a renewal of inflation (normally a probable result of currency devaluation) or a default by the UK government (even though we don’t really have a government at present). The message from elsewhere, especially the EU, is the same. 10 year bund yields were 0.14% three months ago. They are now, as predicted, negative (-0.17%). In Switzerland, even 30 year government bonds yield less than zero. This seems to be confusing aversion to risk with a disinclination to continue to remain alive. The future is unknown. Get over it. I sold some shares ahead of the referendum result on the mistaken view that we would probably vote to Remain. I think that the EU economy is burdened by many problems – unreformed labour markets, burdensome state pension liabilities, unfavourable demographics and ailing banks. European politicians have been allowing the ECB to carry the burden with its “whatever it takes” monetary policy. As I wrote before, “QE looks desperate and desperation does not promote confidence”. It is the banks that really concern me. The share prices of some of Europe’s best known banks are trading near or even below their financial crisis lows. Deutsche Bank...

19 Jun 2014

The yields of bonds issued by government are broadly influenced by three factors: the performance of the underlying economy; the outlook for the currency in which the bonds are denominated; and the probability of default. Eurozone government bonds have demonstrated all three factors at work since the financial crisis hit in 2008. The story can be traced by the changing yields offered by (for example) Italian 10 year government bonds since 2008. In the first half of 2008, yields rose as the market worried that governments would have to issue more debt to bail out a few troubled financial institutions. This was widely expected to be inflationary (bad news for bonds). By mid-2008, worries began to be directed towards the probability that the crisis was going to cause recession and that interest rates were heading down. For two years, Italian bond yields fell. Then the story changed again. The possibility that Italy (and a number of other Eurozone countries) might default caused near panic. Finally, in late 2011, the ECB began to convince investors that a solution would somehow be found. The second blip in yields in the summer of 2012 coincided with much wild talk of the break-up of the euro causing some panicky types to worry that Italy et al would honour their debt in a new made-up currency that they could “print” themselves. This was an irrational fear, not least because much of the German and French banking system was a huge holder of such debt and would have been effectively destroyed. Through the rest of 2012 and 2013, Italian government bond yields normalised, offering a consensus view that the economy was poor, inflation low and the government unreliable but unlikely actually to default. In 2014, something quite different has happened. Yields on Eurozone bonds have started to deliver a single rather shocking message – low economic growth and low inflation are here to stay for years and years. Assuming that an investor is happy to disregard the risk that the Italian government will default, we must contemplate the fact that he apparently believes that a 2.6% return on Italian assets is enough to justify a ten year investment. As the...