The paradoxical results of education for the masses

The paradoxical results of education for the masses

2 Dec 2014

The Churchill wartime government was kicked out by the electorate less than three months after the German surrender in May 1945. Labour won a huge majority and set about a radical socialist programme of nationalisation of key industries and the creation of the NHS and the welfare state. That story is quite well known. What will surprise many people now is that Churchill’s government managed to pass one dramatically progressive piece of parliamentary law in 1944: Rab Butler’s Education Act. There would be free education for all with selection at the age of 11. Children who passed the 11 Plus were eligible for places in grammar schools – it was intended that the top 25% should reach that standard. Places for the other children were to be offered at either secondary modern schools or technical schools which specialised in scientific and mechanical skills. Sadly technical schools were expensive and hard to staff and there were few set up. This gradually created the impression that the majority of children “failed” at the age of 11 and were sent to schools for underachievers. The 1944 act also allowed for the creation of comprehensive schools that could incorporate all standards. Perhaps grammar schools were burdened with having been promoted by a Conservative politician, but socialist politicians grew to dislike their perceived elitism and the Wilson governments of the 60s and 70s embarked on a determined programme of abolition. This culminated in an education act in 1976 which stated that state education “is to be provided only in schools where the arrangements for the admission of pupils are not based (wholly or partly) on selection by reference to ability or aptitude.” The class warrior secretary of state for education leading this was Shirley Williams (St Paul’s School for girls and Somerville College, Oxford). It is a matter of wonder that the most privileged members of the establishment tend to be dismissive of grammar schools and the upwards social mobility that they seem to offer. Our Old Etonian Prime Minister called arguments about grammar schools “splashing around in the shallow end of the educational debate” and “clinging on to outdated mantras that bear no relation to the reality of...

The eurozone is the frozenzone

The eurozone is the frozenzone

19 Jun 2014

The yields of bonds issued by government are broadly influenced by three factors: the performance of the underlying economy; the outlook for the currency in which the bonds are denominated; and the probability of default. Eurozone government bonds have demonstrated all three factors at work since the financial crisis hit in 2008. The story can be traced by the changing yields offered by (for example) Italian 10 year government bonds since 2008. In the first half of 2008, yields rose as the market worried that governments would have to issue more debt to bail out a few troubled financial institutions. This was widely expected to be inflationary (bad news for bonds). By mid-2008, worries began to be directed towards the probability that the crisis was going to cause recession and that interest rates were heading down. For two years, Italian bond yields fell. Then the story changed again. The possibility that Italy (and a number of other Eurozone countries) might default caused near panic. Finally, in late 2011, the ECB began to convince investors that a solution would somehow be found. The second blip in yields in the summer of 2012 coincided with much wild talk of the break-up of the euro causing some panicky types to worry that Italy et al would honour their debt in a new made-up currency that they could “print” themselves. This was an irrational fear, not least because much of the German and French banking system was a huge holder of such debt and would have been effectively destroyed. Through the rest of 2012 and 2013, Italian government bond yields normalised, offering a consensus view that the economy was poor, inflation low and the government unreliable but unlikely actually to default. In 2014, something quite different has happened. Yields on Eurozone bonds have started to deliver a single rather shocking message – low economic growth and low inflation are here to stay for years and years. Assuming that an investor is happy to disregard the risk that the Italian government will default, we must contemplate the fact that he apparently believes that a 2.6% return on Italian assets is enough to justify a ten year investment. As the...